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TECHNICAL NOTE 
Informational Aspects of a Class of Subjective 
Games of Incomplete Information: Static Case' 
D. T E N E K E T Z I S  2 ANI?~ D. A. C A S T A N O N  3 
Communicated by Y. C. Ho 
Abstract. Subjective games of  incomplete information are formulated 
where some of the key assumptions of  Bayesian games of incomplete 
information are relaxed. The issues arising because of  the new formula- 
tion are studied in the context of a class of nonzero-sum, two-person 
games, where each player has a different model of the game. The static 
game is investigated in this note. It is shown that the properties of the 
static subjective game are different from those of the corresponding 
Bayesian game. Counterintuitive outcomes of the game can occur 
because of  the different beliefs of the players, These outcomes may lead 
the players to realize the differences in their models. 
Key Words. Subjective games, incomplete information, public infor- 
mation, private information, secret information, value of information. 
1. Introduction 
G a m e  theory is the mathemat ica l  science which studies decision making 
in situations o f  potential  conflict a m o n g  decisionmakers .  The requirements  
o f  formal game theory  are strict regarding the rules o f  the game and the 
portrayal  o f  exogenous  uncertainty.  Due  to these requirements,  there are 
many  strategic situations which cannot  be initially mode led  as games 
because players lack informat ion  about  available strategies, utility functions,  
or  ou tcomes  resulting f rom various strategies. 
Specifically, the key requirements  o f  formal  game theory  are: 
(A1) the rules o f  the game are c o m m o n  informat ion (Ref. 1) to all 
players o f  the game;  
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(A2) exogenous uncertainty is portrayed by objective probabilities 
which are common knowledge (Ref. 1) to all players; 
(A3) players are fully committed to a priori strategies; 
(A4) players are rational. 
As game theory developed, attempts were made to relax some of these 
assumptions. Requirement (A3) was a consequence of the normalization 
principle of Von Neumann, (Ref. 2); Aumann and Maschler (Ref. 3) were 
the first to point out, via a simple counterexample, the inappropriateness 
of the normalization principle under certain conditions; since then, consider- 
able developments followed by relaxing the requirement of prior commit- 
ment (Refs. 4-8). 
Harsanyi (Ref. 9) and Aumann-Maschler et aL (Ref. 10) pointed out 
that, in some military problems, players may lack full information about 
the payoff functions of other players, or about the physical facilities and 
strategies of other players, or even about the amount of information that 
other players have about the various aspects of the game situation. Thus, 
Harsanyi (Ref. 9) first relaxed requirement (A1) and formulated and 
developed models of games of incomplete information. Harsanyi modeled 
the incomplete information as an exogenous random move (nature's move), 
selecting one of a finite number of possible games; he also assumed that 
the outcomes of this move have a subjective probability distribution which 
is common knowledge to all players. Considerable progress has been 
achieved in the theory of games of incomplete information using Harsanyi's 
original formulation (see Refs. 10-12 and references therein.) 
A restriction in Harsanyi's formulation is the requirement of common 
knowledge of the probability distribution of nature's move. In many strategic 
situations (especially in noncooperative games), this distribution is subjec- 
tively assessed by each player, and subject to individual biases and inac- 
curacies (Ref. 13). In this paper, we formulate a class of games, which we 
call subjective games of incomplete information, which relaxes Harsanyi's 
requirements of common knowledge. Specifically, we allow each person to 
have his own subjective probability distribution of nature's move; in addi- 
tion, each person believes his subjective distribution is common information, 
whereas it is actually secret information (Ref. 14). As a consequence, 
requirements (A1) and (A2) are relaxed, and requirement (A4) is modified, 
in the sense that each player is considered to be rational within his/her 
own subjective view of the game. Various interesting issues arise because 
of our formulation: 
(Q1) How are equilibrium strategies defined for subjective games? 
(Q2) How do these equilibrium strategies relate to the equilibrium 
strategies of the games studied so far? 
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(Q3) Does repetition of  the game result in cooperation as in the case 
of the games studied so far (e.g., Ref. 15)? Does repetition of  the game 
alleviate differences in the subjective assessments of  the players and allow 
players to agree on an equilibrium strategy? Is it possible to characterize 
the set of  all equilibria for repeated subjective games? 
To understand some of  the questions above, we shall consider a special 
class of  games, namely, 2 x 2 two-person, nonzero sum games of  incomplete 
information where the payoff matrices have a special structure. In this note, 
we shall consider the static game and, in a subsequent note (Ref. t6), the 
infinitely repeated game. The rest of  this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we present the model for subjective games, and discuss briefly 
games of incomplete information and point out the differences between 
Harsanyi's model and our  model. In Section 3, we study a static subjective 
noncooperative game of incomplete information. We consider the problem 
under four different types of  information that a player may receive: (i) no 
information; (ii) public information; (iii) private information; (iv) secret 
information. For each case, we investigate the players' rational strategies 
and we define and determine the value of information. We also investigate 
the conditions under which the players realize the differences in their models. 
Conclusions are presented in Section 4. 
2. Formulation of Subjective Games of Incomplete Information 
We shall develop our  theory of  subjective games based on the following 
key assumptions: 
(St) players have different probability assessments on nature's move; 
(S2) each player thinks that the other players' assessments are the 
same as his; 
($3) players are Bayesian; 
($4) each player is rational within his own subjective view of the game. 
Assumption ($2) implies that the rules of  the game are not common 
knowledge to all the players, since each player thinks that the other players' 
assessments are the same as his, yet this may not be true. Assumptions (S1) 
and ($2) were previously used in the context of distributed estimation and 
detection (Ref. 17). 
More precisely, let bi represent the private information of player i 
about the game. This information relates to the outcome of  nature's move. 
In dealing with incomplete information, each player takes a Bayesian 
approach. That is, each player assigns a subjective probability distribution 
P~ =/:',.(b,, b2, . . . ,  b~, . . . ,  b,,) 
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to nature's move and attempts to maximize the mathematical expectation 
of his own payoff J~ in terms of this probability distribution. Furthermore, 
each player i assumes that P~ = Pj, for all j, whereas in the actual game P~ 
and Pj may be different. 
Comparing the mathematical model described above with Harsanyi's 
formulation, we note that Harsanyi also assumes that each player assigns 
a subjective probability distribution P~ to nature's move; although Pi and 
pi may differ, all the distributions P~ are assumed to be common knowledge 
to all players. In our formulation, any difference in subjective probabilities 
is secret information. Moreover, each player is unaware that he has secret 
information. 
3. Static Subjective Noncooperative Games of Incomplete Information 
Problem Formulation. We consider the following static two-person, 
nonzero sum game. Nature selects one of two games with the following 
payoff matrices: 
o" T 
game 1: h I ( a , a )  ( c ,b ) ] ;  (1) 
t~[_(b, c) (d, d )J  
o r T 
game2:  A[(b ,b)  ( d , a ) ]  (2) 
tx [_(a, d)  (c, c) J" 
We further assume that 
a>c>b>d ,  (3) 
b+c>a+d. (4) 
Player 1 can choose action h or /z  and player 2 can choose action o- or ~-. 
Note that, because of (3), each player has a dominant strategy in each one 
of the two games. So far, the statement of the problem and the assumptions 
(3)-(4) are essentially the same as in Ref. 14. However, contrary to Ref. 14, 
we now assume that the two players have a different probability assessment 
of nature's move. Let r be the true probability that nature selects game 1. 
Let p, q be player l 's  and player 2's assessments of this event, respectively. 
Assume that 
p >  1/2, q < l / 2 .  
We will consider this problem under four different types of information 
that a player may receive: 
(C1) no information: in this case, none of the players is informed 
about the outcome of nature's move; 
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(C2) public information: in this case, both players are informed about 
the outcome of nature's move; 
(C3) private information; in this case, one player is informed about  
the outcome of nature's move, whereas the other player is not; moreover,  
this distribution of information is common knowledge; 
(C4) secret information: in this case, one player is informed about 
the outcome of  nature 's  move whereas the other player is uninformed; 
moreover,  the uninformed player is unaware that his opponent  is informed, 
and the informed player knows this. 
The rational strategies in each of these situations are given below. 
(C1) No Information. In this case, player 1 plays A and player 2 plays 
~-. The payoffs of  the two players are 
J °1 = rc + (1 - r )d ,  (5) 
J% = rb + (1 - r )a .  (6) 
(C2) Public Information. In this case, player t plays h in game 1 and 
/z in game 2. Player 2 plays o- in game 1 and z in game 2. Thus, the payoff 
of  the players is 
jB~ = j B  2 = ra + (1 -- r)c.  (7) 
Define the value of information as follows (see also Ref. 18): V,, the 
value of information to player i, is the payoff of  player i when he knows 
the outcome of nature's move minus the payoff of  player i when no player 
is informed about the outcome of  nature's move. In this case, the value of 
public information for players 1 and 2 is given by 
V B' = r ( a  - c)  + (1 - r ) ( c  - d), (8) 
Y B 2 = ( 2 r - 1 ) a + ( 1 - r ) c - r b .  (9) 
(C3) Private Information. Assume at first that player 1 is the informed 
player. Then he plays A in game 1 and / z  in game 2. Player 2 plays z. The 
payoffs of  the two players are 
JP, = c, (10 )  
j R =  r b + ( 1 - r ) c .  (11) 
If  player 2 is the informed player, then he plays o- in game 1 and ~- in 
game 2. I f  
p < ( c  - d ) / ( a  + c - b - d) = p*, (12) 
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then player 1 plays /z. Otherwise, he plays A. The expected payoffs for 
player 1 are then 
JP,= r b + ( 1 - r ) c ,  
JP~ = r a + ( 1 - r ) d ,  
respectively. The payoff for player 2 is 
jP2 = c(corresponding to /x) ,  
jP2 = a(corresponding to A), 
The value of information for the two players is 
v P, = (1 - r ) ( c -  d ) ,  
V e 2 = c - r b - ( l - r ) a ,  i f p < p * ,  
V e~ = r(a  - b), otherwise. 








Assume at first that player 1 is informed 
secretly about the outcome of  nature's move. Then, he plays A in game 1 
and/x  in game 2. Player 2 plays ~'. The payoffs of the two players are 
J C , = c ,  (19) 
J c2 ----  rb+(1  - r)c. (20) 
The value of secret information to player 1 in this case is 
v S , = ( 1 - r ) ( c - d ) .  (21) 
Assume now that player 2 is secretly informed. Then, he plays cr in game 
1 and ~- in game 2. Player ! plays A. The payoffs of  the two players are 
j c ,  = r a + ( 1  - r)d, (22) 
j c 2  = a. (23) 
The value of  secret information to player 2 in this case is 
V s2 = r(a - b). (24) 
Let us discuss some interesting features of the solutions of these games. 
At first, note that each payoff bimatrix is symmetric; hence, in each one of 
the two games, the players are interchangeable. Thus, one expects that, for 
the classical Bayesian game, in the case of public or secret information, the 
behavior of  the informed and the uninformed player will be independent 
of  who is the informed and who is the uninformed player. For example, in 
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the case of private or secret information, if player 1 were the uninformed 
player and played A, we would expect that, if the situation were reversed 
and player 2 became the uninformed player, he would play m Also, in the 
case where no player was informed about the outcome of the chance move 
the dominant strategies would be (A, o-) or (tz, r). Consequently, the value 
of private, secret, or public information would be the same for both players. 
It can be checked easily that this is indeed the case when p = q = r. However, 
this behavior is not observed when each player has his own subjective model 
of the game. When player 1 is privately informed about nature's move, 
player 2 always chooses r (the second column); on the other hand, if player 
2 is informed privately about the outcome of nature's move, player 1 does 
not always play/x (the second row). When player 1 is the secretly informed 
player, player 2 always plays r (second column); if player 2 is the secretly 
informed player, player 1 always plays A (first row). When no player is 
informed about the outcome of the chance move, the outcome of the game 
is (A, r). These facts indicate that the value of private and secret information 
is now different for each player, as is evident from the analysis above. 
For the class of games considered in this section, the value of public, 
private, and secret information differs from player to player, whereas, in 
the classical Bayesian framework, this value does not depend on who is the 
informed and who is the uninformed player. This phenomenon is due to 
the differences in the initial probability assessments of the incomplete 
information. 
Another interesting observation follows from the previous results. Con- 
sider the case where player 2 is privately informed, p <p*,  and r =  1/2. 
Then, the value of information for player 2 is given by 
P V2 = c - 0 . 5 b - 0 . 5 a .  
If  
c<0.5a+O.5b, 
the value of private information for player 2 is negative! On the other hand, 
the gain for player 1, the uninformed player, is equal to 0.5 ( b - d ) ,  which 
is positive. Thus, for the class of  symmetric games considered in this paper, 
we have a case where the value of private information is negative for the 
informed player and the uninformed player benefits from the situation! 
This phenomenon never occurs for this class of games in the classical 
Bayesian framework, where, if the value of  private information is negative 
for the informed player, the uninformed player cannot benefit either 
(Ref. 13). Even more surprising in this case is the fact that the informed 
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player wants to use his private information, whereas the uninformed player 
wishes that the informed player acted as if he were not informed! 
The reason for all these counterintuitive results and the differences 
between the subjective game results and the classical Bayesian game results 
is that each player evaluates the game as well as the behavior of his opponent  
in the game in terms of his own model and acts accordingly. Such subjective 
evaluations lead to behavior which would never occur in the classical 
Bayesian formulation as evidenced by the previous analysis. 
One issue that arises naturally in these games is the following: How 
do the players involved in the game interpret its outcome? Do they realize 
that they have different models? If neither player is informed about the 
outcome of  nature's move, player 1 expects that player 2 will use strategy 
o- and player 2 expects that player 1 will use strategy/x. At the end of  the 
game, each player finds out that the outcome is the opposite of  what he 
expected. Since each player assumes that his opponent  is rational, both 
players conclude that they have different models. Similar phenomena occur 
if one of the players is either secretly or privately informed. 
In the case of secret information, the secretly informed player discovers 
at the end of the game that his opponent 's  perception of the game is different 
from his. On the other hand, the uninformed player may never discover 
that his opponent  has a different perception of  the game, or he may not be 
able to interpret his opponent 's  move in terms of his own model, in which 
case he can conclude that either his opponent  has a different model of the 
game, or his opponent  has secret information. 
In the case of private information, the uninformed player is not in a 
position to discover at the end of the game that his opponent  has a different 
view of the game. The informed player may or may not discover at the end 
of  the game that he and his opponent  have inconsistent beliefs about the 
game, depending on whether Eq. (12) holds. 
Note that, if  both p, q > 1/2 or p, q < 1/2, the players never discover 
the differences in their model. 
4. Conclusions 
In this note, we formulated a class of subjective games, where the players 
have different perceptions of  the rules of the game and are unaware of  
the differences in their perception. We studied in detail a specific class of 
static symmetric games of incomplete information, and we showed that the 
properties of these subjective games are different from the properties of  
similar Bayesian games. Specifically, many features of the Bayesian games, 
such as the positive value of private informtion in symmetric games, are 
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not maintained when the players '  perceptions of  the game are allowed to 
differ. The inconsistent beliefs of  the players lead to counterintuitive 
behavior. 
The rudimentary investigation reported here needs to be carried further. 
An important issue which has not been addressed so far is whether the 
differences in beliefs between the two players are amplified or" smoothed 
out if the game is repeated infinitely many times. In addition, our analysis 
should be extended beyond the point where the two players reach an 
impasse. Some of these issues, namely, the effect of  the infinite repetition 
of the game as well as the effect of  the bargaining models adopted by the 
players on the outcome of  the game, will be addressed in a forthcoming 
paper  (Ref. 16). 
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